GitHub Actions security for coding agents: a $0.10 line-accurate audit of a repo's workflows (pwn requests, script injection, token permissions, unpinned/compromised/deprecated actions, retired runners, leaked secrets) with fixes, live commit-SHA pins and a git-apply patch, and $0.02 SHA pinning for any action. Pay per call with x402 (USDC on Base) or MPP (USDC.e on Tempo), or buy a 24-hour pass. No keys, no accounts.
GitHub Actions Workflow Security Audit
$0.10/call
Security + reliability audit of GitHub Actions workflows for coding agents: pass repo=owner/name (all workflows, default branch), url= (one file) or yaml= (text). ~30 line-accurate checks: pwn requests (pull_request_target/workflow_run running PR code), script injection from PR titles/branch names/comments, artifact poisoning, leaked credentials, token permissions (missing/write-all/broad/OIDC), secrets: inherit, unpinned or compromised actions, deprecated actions that now fail (upload-artifact v3, cache v2), retired runners (ubuntu-20.04, windows-2019), self-hosted runners on PRs, ArtiPACKED token leaks, curl|sh, set-output, invalid structure, timeouts. Returns score/grade, findings with evidence + why + fix, commit-SHA pins resolved live from GitHub, and two git-apply patches (safe, hardening). No input = built-in sample. Failures are not charged.
GET https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/v1/gha/audit
Pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs
$0.02/call
Resolve GitHub Actions references to immutable commit SHAs, live from GitHub: actions=actions/checkout@v4,docker/login-action@v3 (up to 20), or repo=/url=/yaml= to pin every uses: in those workflows. Per action: commit SHA (annotated tags peeled), the most specific version tag at that commit (v4 -> v4.2.2) for the "# version" comment, a ready-to-paste uses: line, the latest release tag and whether a newer major exists; branches are flagged. Use it while writing or hardening CI (OpenSSF Scorecard Pinned-Dependencies). No input = 6 popular actions. Not charged if GitHub cannot be reached.
GET https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/v1/gha/pin
CI Guard 24-hour pass
$0.50/24h
One payment, 24 hours of unlimited GitHub Actions audits (/v1/gha/audit, $0.10 each) and SHA pinning (/v1/gha/pin, $0.02 each) on this service. Returns a bearer token: send it as Authorization: Bearer <token> (or X-CI-Guard-Pass) and paid routes answer without a new payment until it expires. Worth it from the 6th audit: hardening an organization's repositories in one session or reviewing many workflow PRs. No parameters.
GET https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/v1/pass/day
CI Guard 30-day pass + Team Kit
$3.00/30 days
One payment, 30 days of unlimited GitHub Actions audits (/v1/gha/audit, $0.10 each) and SHA pinning (/v1/gha/pin, $0.02 each) on this service. Returns a bearer token: send it as Authorization: Bearer <token> (or X-CI-Guard-Pass) and paid routes answer without a new payment until it expires. For agents that audit every workflow change they touch or pin actions in every workflow they write: cheaper than per-call from the 31st audit in a month. Also downloads the self-hosted Team Kit (GET /v1/kit/download with the same bearer token; see /kit). No parameters.
GET https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/v1/pass/month
How to call
curl -i "https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/v1/peek?repo=owner/name" # free: score + counts
# paid (any x402 client, e.g. x402-fetch / AgentCash, or MPP: npx mppx <url>)
GET https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/v1/gha/audit?repo=owner/name # $0.10
GET https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/v1/gha/pin?actions=actions/checkout@v4 # $0.02
POST https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/v1/gha/audit -H 'content-type: text/yaml' --data-binary @.github/workflows/ci.yml
git apply <<< "$(jq -r .patch.safe audit.json)" # SHA pins + set-output fixes
Use it from Claude Code, Cursor or VS Code (MCP)
claude mcp add --transport http ci-guard https://ravi-ci-guard.agent-arena-base.workers.dev/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer <pass>"
# free without a pass: audit_sample, peek_workflows, list_rules, payment_options
# with a pass: audit_workflows, pin_actions (prompt: harden_github_actions)
No x402 wallet? Pay with a plain USDC transfer
Send USDC on Base to 0xf20b05f3fcf799B1d03702446b0107A50830CA92: 0.50 = 24-hour pass, 3 = 30-day pass + Team Kit, 8 = 90-day pass + Team Kit. Then GET /v1/pass/redeem?tx=<hash>. Instructions: /v1/pass/transfer.
Self-hosted: the Team Kit
The same rules engine as a zero-install CLI and CI gate for your own runners (SARIF, git-apply patches, 62 self-tests, MIT). Workflow files never leave your network. What is inside, sample report, sha256.
What it checks
pwn-request pull_request_target / workflow_run checks out and runs untrusted PR code with secrets and a write token
script-injection Attacker-controlled ${{ }} expression expanded inside a run: script or github-script
privileged-trigger Workflow runs on pull_request_target or workflow_run (privileged context for untrusted events)
artifact-poisoning workflow_run downloads artifacts produced by an untrusted run
hardcoded-secret Credential committed in the workflow file
unsecure-commands ACTIONS_ALLOW_UNSECURE_COMMANDS or ::set-env / ::add-path (disabled, injectable)
curl-pipe-shell Remote script piped straight into a shell
secret-in-run ${{ secrets.* }} expanded directly in a run: script
input-injection workflow_dispatch / workflow_call input expanded directly in a run: script
bot-condition Security decision based on github.actor (spoofable)
cache-poisoning Release/publish workflow restores a cache that pull-request runs can write
invalid-workflow Structure GitHub will reject or misread (missing on/jobs/runs-on, bad needs, both uses and run, bad cron)
yaml-error YAML problem (tabs, duplicate keys, bad indentation)
missing-timeout Job without timeout-minutes (default is 360 minutes of runner time)
missing-concurrency Push / PR workflow without a concurrency group (superseded runs keep burning minutes)
npm-install npm install in CI instead of npm ci (non-reproducible installs)
Method
30 rule families over the parsed workflow (line-accurate): pwn requests (pull_request_target/workflow_run checking out PR code), script injection from attacker-controlled contexts into run:/github-script, artifact poisoning, hard-coded credentials, unsecure commands, GITHUB_TOKEN permissions (missing, write-all, broad, OIDC), secrets: inherit, unpinned actions/images, compromised actions, deprecated official action majors (shut-down artifact/cache backends, Node 12/16 runtimes), retired runner images, self-hosted runners on PRs, ArtiPACKED token leaks, persist-credentials, deprecated set-output, curl|sh, bot-actor conditions, cache poisoning in release workflows, invalid structure (missing runs-on, unknown needs, bad cron), timeouts and concurrency. Pins are resolved live from GitHub's git refs (tag -> commit, peeled), with the most specific version tag at that commit as the comment. Severity: critical/high/medium/low/info; score = 100 minus weighted findings (each rule counted at most 3 times). Static analysis only: nothing is executed.
Payment policy
Input is validated before any payment is touched; failed work (GitHub unreachable, repo/ref not found, not a workflow) is never settled or broadcast. x402 (Base): a result is released only after the USDC settlement is confirmed (by the facilitator, or on-chain on Base); if settlement cannot be confirmed you get HTTP 402 and no result. MPP (Tempo): the server broadcasts your signed USDC.e transfer itself and releases the result when the receipt shows it; if the Tempo RPC gives no definite answer the result is released anyway, marked unconfirmed. Static analysis only: your code is never executed; fetched files are not stored.