{
  "rules": [
    {
      "id": "pwn-request",
      "title": "pull_request_target / workflow_run checks out and runs untrusted PR code with secrets and a write token"
    },
    {
      "id": "script-injection",
      "title": "Attacker-controlled ${{ }} expression expanded inside a run: script or github-script"
    },
    {
      "id": "privileged-trigger",
      "title": "Workflow runs on pull_request_target or workflow_run (privileged context for untrusted events)"
    },
    {
      "id": "artifact-poisoning",
      "title": "workflow_run downloads artifacts produced by an untrusted run"
    },
    {
      "id": "hardcoded-secret",
      "title": "Credential committed in the workflow file"
    },
    {
      "id": "unsecure-commands",
      "title": "ACTIONS_ALLOW_UNSECURE_COMMANDS or ::set-env / ::add-path (disabled, injectable)"
    },
    {
      "id": "permissions-write-all",
      "title": "GITHUB_TOKEN granted write-all"
    },
    {
      "id": "permissions-missing",
      "title": "No permissions: block, so the token gets the repository/organization default (often read-write)"
    },
    {
      "id": "permissions-broad",
      "title": "Write scopes granted at workflow level instead of only to the job that needs them"
    },
    {
      "id": "oidc-workflow-level",
      "title": "id-token: write granted to every job"
    },
    {
      "id": "secrets-inherit",
      "title": "Reusable workflow called with secrets: inherit"
    },
    {
      "id": "unpinned-action",
      "title": "Action referenced by a mutable tag or branch instead of a full commit SHA"
    },
    {
      "id": "unpinned-image",
      "title": "Container image referenced by a mutable tag instead of a digest"
    },
    {
      "id": "compromised-action",
      "title": "Action with a published supply-chain compromise"
    },
    {
      "id": "deprecated-action",
      "title": "Outdated major version of an official action (deprecated runtime or shut-down backend)"
    },
    {
      "id": "retired-runner",
      "title": "runs-on uses a retired GitHub-hosted runner image"
    },
    {
      "id": "self-hosted-public",
      "title": "Self-hosted runner reachable from pull requests"
    },
    {
      "id": "artipacked",
      "title": "checkout keeps the token in .git/config and the workspace is uploaded as an artifact"
    },
    {
      "id": "persist-credentials",
      "title": "actions/checkout leaves the GITHUB_TOKEN in .git/config for later steps"
    },
    {
      "id": "deprecated-command",
      "title": "::set-output / ::save-state workflow commands (deprecated)"
    },
    {
      "id": "curl-pipe-shell",
      "title": "Remote script piped straight into a shell"
    },
    {
      "id": "secret-in-run",
      "title": "${{ secrets.* }} expanded directly in a run: script"
    },
    {
      "id": "input-injection",
      "title": "workflow_dispatch / workflow_call input expanded directly in a run: script"
    },
    {
      "id": "bot-condition",
      "title": "Security decision based on github.actor (spoofable)"
    },
    {
      "id": "cache-poisoning",
      "title": "Release/publish workflow restores a cache that pull-request runs can write"
    },
    {
      "id": "invalid-workflow",
      "title": "Structure GitHub will reject or misread (missing on/jobs/runs-on, bad needs, both uses and run, bad cron)"
    },
    {
      "id": "yaml-error",
      "title": "YAML problem (tabs, duplicate keys, bad indentation)"
    },
    {
      "id": "missing-timeout",
      "title": "Job without timeout-minutes (default is 360 minutes of runner time)"
    },
    {
      "id": "missing-concurrency",
      "title": "Push / PR workflow without a concurrency group (superseded runs keep burning minutes)"
    },
    {
      "id": "npm-install",
      "title": "npm install in CI instead of npm ci (non-reproducible installs)"
    }
  ],
  "methodology": "30 rule families over the parsed workflow (line-accurate): pwn requests (pull_request_target/workflow_run checking out PR code), script injection from attacker-controlled contexts into run:/github-script, artifact poisoning, hard-coded credentials, unsecure commands, GITHUB_TOKEN permissions (missing, write-all, broad, OIDC), secrets: inherit, unpinned actions/images, compromised actions, deprecated official action majors (shut-down artifact/cache backends, Node 12/16 runtimes), retired runner images, self-hosted runners on PRs, ArtiPACKED token leaks, persist-credentials, deprecated set-output, curl|sh, bot-actor conditions, cache poisoning in release workflows, invalid structure (missing runs-on, unknown needs, bad cron), timeouts and concurrency. Pins are resolved live from GitHub's git refs (tag -> commit, peeled), with the most specific version tag at that commit as the comment. Severity: critical/high/medium/low/info; score = 100 minus weighted findings (each rule counted at most 3 times). Static analysis only: nothing is executed."
}